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For the first time in its history, Maryland has adopted a code of evidence. The code, found in Title 5 of the
Maryland Rules, went into effect July I, 1994. Title 5 is derived largely from the Federal Rules of Evidence and
from the federal rules' state counterpart model, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, as well as from the pre-Title 5
Maryland Law.
Much of Title 5 is consistent with the prior Maryland law, even if that law was inconsistent with the federal
rules. In some instances, however, the rules in Title 5 follow the federal or uniform rules' model instead. In others,
Title 5 adopts an approach which was thought to borrow the best from the federal and the state models.
One of the most controversial issues was whether to adopt the federal rules' residual hearsay exceptions,
popularly known as the "catch-all" exceptions. In an effort not to freeze the hearsay doctrine from further
development, ultimately the court ofappeals adopted those exceptions. But the court approved a Committee Note
with much cautionary language. The court's intention clearly was not to follow those federal courts which have
used the hearsay catch-aIls very liberally.
The following article, by my former student Sang Oh, presents a thoughtful analysis of Maryland 's adoption
ofthe residual hearsay exceptions, and offers guidance to the state's courts in applying them.

Lynn McLain, Professor
University of Baltimore School of Law

GARBAGE, NEAR MISSES, AND GLASS SLIPPERS:
THE SCOPE OF ADMISSIBILITY UNDER
MARYLAND'S RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
SangW.Oh

On July 1, 1994, the new Maryland Rules of Evidence as provided in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules
became applicable in all trials and hearings. 1 Although
much of Maryland's current law ofevidence will remain
intact under Title 5, the new evidence rules will create
a number ofsubstantive changes. Among these changes
are Maryland Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5),
collectively referred to as the residual or catch-all
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 2
Derived from Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), Maryland's residual exceptions allow a
court to admit hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible if the evidence satisfies certain reliability and
necessity standards. Part I of this article will provide a
general background regarding the residual exceptions
and Maryland's adoption of these hearsay exceptions.

Part II will analyze and propose standards by which
evidence should be introduced under these rules in a
manner consistent with both the intent of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland and the historical treatment of
hearsay evidence. Part III will address the constitutional issues raised by the admission of hearsay under
the residual exceptions against a criminal defendant.
Part IV will defme and discuss the categories ofresidual
hearsay. Finally, Part V will discuss and analyze
foreseeable issues.

I. BACKGROUND
In general, a jurisdiction's adoption of a residual
exception is often accompanied by ambivalent expectations ofincreasedjudicial activism. Whereas some view
the residual exceptions as a positive effort to free the law

of evidence from the "straightjacket" of the common
Against this backdrop, courts and practitioners are
law's rigorous treatment of hearsay, 3 others view the given the task of balancing the scales and shaping the
exceptions as "a 'Trojan Horse' that has been set upon character of Maryland's residual exceptions. At this
the judiciary to wreak havoc and to emasculate the rule point, the practical development ofMaryland' s residual
against hearsay."4
exceptions remains an open question, but it is not a
Despite the possibility of adverse consequences question without probable answers.
brought about by the residual exceptions, the court of
The residual exceptions are supported by almost
appeals adopted Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5), nineteen years of case law from the federal courts and
evidencing its willingness to accept these risks in favor various state jurisdictions, many of which share the
ofwhat it perceived to be a greater necessity -- the need Maryland Rules Committee's intent that the residual
to infuse flexibility into the law of evidence and to aid exceptions be used only under exceptional circumits continual growth and development. 5
stances. This fact, coupled with the noThe Committee Note following Marytion that Maryland courts have traditionland Rule 5-803(b)(24), however, really been somewhat rigorous in their ap· .. courts and
veals that the court of appeals was not
proach to the hearsay rule and its exceppractitioners are
without reservations:
tions, evidences much in predicting Marygiven the task of
land's future treatment of the residual
balancing the
The residual exceptions provided by Rule
exceptions. In short, the future of the
5-803(b)(24) and Rule 5-804(b)(5) do
scales and shaping residual exceptions may have already been
not contemplate an unfettered exercise
the character of detennined.
of judicial discretion, but they do proMaryland's residvide for treating new and presently unanII. THE SCOPE OF ADMISSmILual exceptions.
ticipated situations which demonstrate a
ITY
trustworthiness within the spirit of the
Admissibility under Maryland's residuspecifically stated exceptions. Within
al exceptions is conditional upon the fulthis framework, room is left for growth and develop- fillment of five elements: (1) that the hearsay statement
ment ofthe law of evidence in the hearsay area, consis- possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
tent with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 5-102. equivalent to those exceptions provided for in 5It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be 803(b)(1) through (23) and 5-804(b)(I) through (4);
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. (2) that the statement be offered as evidence of a
The Committee does not intend to establish a broad material fact; (3) that the statement be more probative
license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that on the point for which it is offered than any other
do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained evidence which the proponent can procure through
in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b). The residual exceptions reasonable efforts; (4) that the general purposes of the
are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions ofthe Maryland Rules ofEvidence and the interests ofjustice
hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such be best served by admission of the statement into
major revisions are best accomplished by amendments evidence; and (5) that the opposing party be given
to the Rule itself It is intended that in any case in which advance notice of the intention to offer the statement
evidence is sought to be admitted under these subsec- along with the particulars of the statement. All five of
tions, the trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection, these criteria must be met before a hearsay statement
and caution than the courts did under the common law will be admitted pursuant to the residual exceptions.
in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the
When a statement is admitted under either of these
hearsay rule. 6
exceptions, the court should make an on-the-record
ruling that the requirements ofthe exception have been
9
satisfied.
The appellate standard ofreview is ordinarily
Some would assert that the committee's intent is
"taut with internal conflict."7 Along with an invitation an abuse of discretion standard. 10
to use the residual exceptions to admit reliable hearsay A. Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
is a caveat to employ the exceptions sparingly. 8
_ _ _ _.___ .___________________________________. 25.1 / U. Balt.
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The element of trustworthiness is the heart of the
admissibility analysis under the residual exceptions. It
is not only the most important element, but also the most
difficult to analyze.
Courts have employed a number of methods in
determining the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement
offered under the residual exceptions. One method is to
compare the circumstances surrounding the utterance
ofthe hearsay statement to underlying factors ofrecognized hearsay exceptions. I I Although the comparison
method is frequently employed with positive results,
there is a significant possibility that this method could
result in error. For this reason, the comparison method
should not be used.
Courts that employ the comparison method as a
matter of course often do so either haphazardly or
perfunctorily.12 In doing so, they demonstrate a lack of
understanding of the nature of hearsay and why it is
deemed inherently untrustworthy.
The problem with hearsay evidence can best be
understood by analyzing testimonial proof: 13
When a witness testifies [in court] about an event, he is
saying that he perceived a particular fact, remembered
it up to the moment oftestifying, and is now accurately
expressing his memory in words. Error, deliberate or
unconscious, can enter this process anywhere between
the initial perception and the in-court narration. For
instance, the witness may not have perceived the event
at all, or he may have seen it without understanding, or
his impression may have been affected by his emotional
and intellectual condition at the moment, or he may have
seen it so fleetingly that no accurate impression has
remained. Or even ifhe accurately perceived the event
when it occurred, the passage oftime may have dulled
his recollection or replaced the remembered facts with
others. He may be deliberately lying in court, or be
honestly mistaken, or be incapable of translating his
memory into language that will have the same meaning
to his listeners. 14
These problems can be reduced into two salient
questions: (1) Does the witness truly have the belief?
and (2) Does the witness's belief genuinely reflect
reality?15 Only ifboth questions can be answered affirmatively will a court be justified in relying on the
witness's statement for the truth of the matter asserted.
These two questions can be further reduced into

four distinct factors. 16 The first question contains the
factors ofnarration/ambiguity (Do the witness's words
accurately express what he wants to convey?) and
sincerity (Is the witness telling the truth as he understands it?).17 The second question is comprised of
perception (Did the witness actually perceive what he
thinks he did?) and memory (Did the witness accurately
remember what he had perceived?). 18
It is for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of
any inaccuracies in these four factors that a witness is
required to testify at trial (1) under oath, (2) personally,
so that the trier of fact can observe the witness's
demeanor, and (3) subject to cross-examination.1 9
Hearsay evidence is ordinarily excluded because an outof-court statement cannot be subjected to these truthencouraging requirements and, consequently, the
strengths or weaknesses of any of the four factors
cannot be determined. 20
When hearsay is admitted pursuant to an exception,
it is admitted because the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement provide sufficient answers
to the relevant inquiries under the four factors such that
the decalarant' s appearance at trial is unnecessary. For
example, under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule, a hearsay statement is admissible if the
statement relates to a startling event or condition and
was made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition. 21
The pertinent questions are whether the declarant
believed the statement to be true and whether the
witness's belief reflected reality. Under the first prong,
sincerity is sufficiently assured because the stress of
excitement caused by the startling event would render
any reflective capabilities inoperative. 22 Narration ordinarily would not be a problem unless the perceived
event was comp lex or the out-of-court statement could
be subject to differing interpretations.
The memory factor under the second prong is
satisfied because the requirement that the statement be
made while under the stress of the event assures a
relatively short passage oftime between the event and
the utterance. 23 Arguably, the only remaining problem
would be whether the declarant's perception was impaired by excitement. 24 For most courts, however, the
perception factor is not problematic. Even if perception
in an excited state may be less trustworthy than unexcited perception, the overall circumstances oftrustworthiness surrounding an excited utterance is not under-
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mined. 25 Hence, despite the fact that an excited utter- available and subject to cross-examination, and the
ance is a hearsay statement, it is not dependent upon an hearsay in question satisfies the perception, memory,
oath, a personal appearance by the declarant, or a cross- and narration factors. 3o In essence, these courts substiexamination of the declarant to assure its trustworthi- tute the hearsay declarant's demeanor at trial to determine sincerity at the time ofthe out-of-court statement.
ness.
The key result in this analysis of the excited utterThis method may be problematic. First, admission
ance exception is that at least one factor from each of the hearsay statement may not demonstrate the
prong is satisfied (sincerity for the first prong and necessity required under the residual exceptions since
memory in the second) and the remaining factors are not the live testimony of the declarant, especially ifunbisignificantly dubious. Thus, an
ased, is ordinarily considaffirmative answer to the two
ered to be more probative
overriding questions concerning
evidence. 3l
When
hearsay
is
admitted
the declarant's beliefcan be subSecond, delayed crosspursuant to an exception, it is
stantiated. Scrutinizing any of
examination examines a
admitted because the circumthe other currently recognized
witness's story only after
or firmly-rooted exceptions usit has had an opportunity
stances surrounding the making this test ofthe two questions
to solidify, making it less
ing of the statement provide
vulnerable to probing.32
and its four factors (the "trustsufficient answers to the releThus, sincerity problems,
worthiness test") produces simifour
vant
inquiries
under
the
26
1ar results.
if they exist, will not be
factors such that the
Since admissibility under the
fully scrutinized.
decalarant's appearance at trial is
residual exceptions requires cirConsider, for example,
cumstantial guarantees of trustan automobile collision
unnecessary.
worthiness equivalenttothe firmcase in which an eyewitly-rooted exceptions, it follows
ness utters an uncertain
that only hearsay statements satand erroneous statement
isfying the trustworthiness test can be deemed suffi- that driver A was at fault. Ascertaining problems with
ciently trustworthy. 27 In practical terms, this means that the eyewitness's sincerity may be hindered by allowing
in order for a hearsay statement to be considered driver B to introduce the eyewitness's prior statement
trustworthy, at least one factor from each prong must as residual hearsay and consequently, as substantive
be sufficiently satisfied with the remaining factors not evidence, to buttress the eyewitness's in-court testimoseriously in doubt. 28
ny prior to any impeachment. Because these predicaThe trustworthiness test, and the results that it ments may exist, the preferred course is to adopt a strict
produces, is preferable to the comparison method be- application of the trustworthiness questions.
cause necessary consideration is given to all of the B. The Material Fact Requirement
The requirement that a hearsay statement proffered
pertinent questions. A court that utilizes the comparison method risks the chance of admitting hearsay on under the residual exceptions be probative ofa material
primarily one factor or what it perceives to be the fact has not proven to be significant in the residual
satisfaction of numerous factors, only to have all of the exceptions analysis. In general, courts have interpreted
factors pertaining to one prong. 29 In other words, these this requirement as a restatement ofthe general requirecourts often answer only one of the pertinent inquiries ment that evidence must be relevant. 33
of a proper hearsay analysis. The result is that, occaThe material fact requirement may justifiably take
sionally, a hearsay statement admitted under a residual on a more significant meaning when it is interpreted as
exception using the comparison method lacks the req- a requirement that the proffered hearsay statement be
uisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness probative not only ofa "material" issue, but one that is
equivalent to the firmly-rooted exceptions.
also "important" to the outcome of the case. 34 Courts
Some courts have modified the trustworthiness test are unlikely, however, to consider the argument that
by admitting residual hearsay when the declarant is "material" means "essential," in the sense that without
____ .--_ .•____ . _ _ _ _ .. ~-._. ___ , 25.1/ U. Bait. L.F. - SJ
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the residual hearsay the proponent's case would fail. 35
The plain meaning of "material" is not synonymous
with "essential. "36

C. The Necessity Requirement
The third clause ofthe residual exceptions provides
that the hearsay statement be more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts. Most often referred to as the necessity requirement,37 this clause is "intended to insure that only
statements which have high probative value and necessity may qualify for admission under the residual exceptions."38
The necessity requirement has proven to be significant in residual exceptions analysis, perhaps second in
importance only to the trustworthiness requirement. It
is the combination of necessity and trustworthiness
which qualifies hearsay statements to create the exceptional circumstances that justify its admission under the
residual exceptions. 39
The necessity requirement precludes the admission
of hearsay evidence if there is reasonably obtainable
evidence more probative on the point for which it is
offered than the hearsay statement and the proponent
fails to procure that evidence for trial. 40 Residual
hearsay should also be excluded if other evidence,
which is more probative on the point for which the
hearsay is offered, has already been admitted and the
hearsay at issue possesses minimal probative value in
light of the other evidence. 41 In that case, the hearsay
should be excluded on the grounds that it would essentially amount to cumulative evidence. 42
On balance, a proponent will satisfy the necessity
requirement by showing that reasonable and diligent
efforts could not have obtained evidence which is more
probative than the proffered hearsay or that more
probative evidence could not have been procured because of an unreasonable burden.43 Hence, it is important that the court take into account the resources of the
proponent and what is at stake in the litigation. "What
amounts to 'reasonable efforts' by a corporate litigant
in an enormous treble damage action is not the same as
the 'reasonable efforts' which may be expected of an
indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution. "44
One last issue raised by the necessity requirement
under Rule 5-803(b)(24) is whether the live testimony
of an available witness, if reasonably obtainable, will
always constitute evidence more probative on the point

for which it is offered than a hearsay statement. 45 Most
courts would hold that for the purposes of Rule 5803(b)(24), the live testimony of an available witness
would possess more probative value in establishing the
truth than a bare hearsay statement since the jury would
be able to observe the witness's demeanor and the
witness's testimony would be subjectto cross-examination.46 However, if circumstances such as time, duration, or mental infirmity prevent a witness from rendering full and adequate testimony, the most probative
evidence may well be the proffered hearsay Y

D. The Interests of Justice Requirement
The interests ofj ustice requirement is a restatement
oftheprinciplescontainedinMd. Rule 5-102.48 Rule 5102 provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth and development ofthe law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
Undoubtedly, these are desirable goals, but it is precarious to utilize such words as a pragmatic touchstone for
guidance in resolving specific issues.
The danger arises when courts interpret the interests of justice requirement as a discretionary power to
decide issues based upon personal notions of justice.
This interpretation is partially correct; courts do and
should exclude hearsay evidence on the basis that
admission does not serve the interests ofjustice. However, hearsay evidence should never be admitted under
the residual exceptions solely upon this basis.49
The interests of justice requirement is but one
criterion of admissibility under the residual exceptions.
Admitting evidence solely on this basis would disregard
the importance of the four other requirements. Courts
have also made the mistake of interpreting the interests
of justice requirement so as to blur the requirement with
the necessity or trustworthiness requirement. 50
E. Notice Requirement
The last requirement of the residual exceptions
mandates that the proponent of the hearsay evidence
provide the opponent with notice of the intent to offer
the evidence "sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the [opponent] with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it." Facially, the clause appears
inflexible, suggesting that ifnotice is not provided to the
opponent prior to trial, hearsay evidence is barred under
the residual exceptions.
Although some courts have enforced this provision

strictly,51 most courts have adopted a flexible approach the defendant and her co-defendants as the child's
if the need for the hearsay statement arises shortly abusers.
Citing Ohio v. Roberts,62 the Court held that in order
before or during the trial, provided that a continuance
affords the opponent an adequate opportunity to pre- to satisfY the Confrontation Clause, the proponent of
pare. 52 Some courts have dispensed with the notice incriminating hearsay not falling within a firmly-rooted
requirement if the opponent either possessed the re- hearsay exception63 has the burden of proving that the
sidual hearsay evidence for inspection prior to trial or statement possesses "particularized guarantees oftrustfailed to assert the need for a continuance. 53 Virtually worthiness."64 To determine the existence of these
all courts, however, hold that after a certain point in the particularized guarantees, a court must look at "the
trial process evidence cannot be admitted under the totality of circumstances that surround the making of
residual exceptions if notice has not been given to the the statement and that render the declarant particularly
opponent. 54
worthy ofbelief... [such that] adversarial testing would
Of these three approaches, the flexible approach is add little to [the statement's] reliability."6
the most preferable. 55 Given the uncertain nature ofthe
The Wright Court held, however, that the existence
trial process, there will be occasions when even the most of corroborating evidence could not be considered in
conscientious litigator will be faced with situations of evaluating the totality of circumstances. To hold o~h
genuine surprise. 56 In such a situation, the notice erwise would be to "permit admission of a presumprequirement should be interpreted to require that the tively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the
court provide the opponent with a continuance suffi- trustworthiness ofother evidence at trial."66 This result
cient to prepare to meet the
would be at "odds with the
belated proffer. 57 But courts
requirement that hearsay evishould require the proponent to
dence admitted under the
show the inability to have preConfrontation
Clause be so
... a court must look at
dicted the need to offer the heartrustworthy that cross-exam"the totality of circumsay in question under the residination ofthe declarant would
stances that surround the
be of marginal utility."67
ual exceptions in advance of
making of the statement
trial. 58 The flexible approach
Wright applies to the adand that render the
satisfies the purpose of the nomission ofincriminating heartice requirement, which is to
say evidence against a crimdeclarant particularly
provide adequate time for the
inal defendant under Rule 5worthy of belief. .. "
opponent to prepare, 59 and plac804(b)(5). The court must
es the opponent in no worse a
consider and satisfY the reposition than he would have
quirements of the Confronfaced had pretrial notice been given. 60
tation Clause by finding particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness without regard to corroborative evim. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO dence.
CATCH-ALL HEARSAY
The Wright decision should not be an additional
A. The Right of Confrontation
concern in 5-804(b)(5) analysis if the trustworthiness
When a hearsay statement is to be admitted against analysis as advocated above in section IlIA. is fola criminal defendant and the declarant is unavailable to lowed. The trustworthiness test incorporates the contestifY at trial, there may be another consideration to siderations and rationale as mandated by the decision in
admitting hearsay even after a court has made the Wright. 68
determination that the statement satisfies the five re- B. Due Process Considerations
quirements under the residual exceptions.
Unlike the Confrontation Clause, which may operIn Idaho v. Wright,61 the United States Supreme ate to heighten the standard of admissibility under Rule
Court considered whether the right of confrontation 5-804(b)(5), the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth
precludes a court from admitting as residual hearsay Amendment may serve to abate rigid adherence to one
testimony from an unavailable child witness identifYing or more of the five requirements of the residual excep_25.1/0. Ball.

:....? - ~ ~

tions.
In Foster v. State,69 the trial court rejected the
defendant's proffer of an out-of-court statement in
which a murder victim told a friend that she had been
threatened by the defendant's husband. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the proffered testimony
was critical to the defense's theory thatthe defendant's
husband had committed the murder. The exclusion of
the statement, on hearsay grounds, was held to have
violated the defendant's due process rights because it
deprived the defendant ofa fair trial. 70 The court opined
that the statement bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness which would favor admissibility.71 The
defendant's husband's threat was both spontaneous and
a statement against interest. The victim's statement was
also made spontaneously, in an excited state, and under
circumstances in which she had no reason to lie. There
was also evidence to corroborate the truth of the
statement as well as the presence of the accused's
husband for cross-examination. 72
The Foster decision stands for the principle that if
a criminal defendant offers trustworthy hearsay evidence which is critical to a defense, such that exclusion
ofthat evidence would amount to a denial of a fair trial,
exclusion ofthat evidence may constitute a denial ofdue
process. 73 Applying Foster to a criminal defendant's
offer ofhearsay evidence under the residual exceptions,
ifthe hearsay statement is trustworthy and critical to the
defense but fails to comply with, for example, the notice
requirement, due process may demand that a flexible
approach be employed to facilitate admission of the
hearsay.74

evidence asserted that the residual hearsay exceptions
could not be invoked to admit hearsay evidence if that
evidence is generally of a type covered by another
specific hearsay exception, but fails to meet the precise
requirements of that specific exception. The issue
raised by this contention has come to be known as the
"near miss" problem.
Courts differ widely in their analysis of this issue.
Some courts hold that the failure ofhearsay evidence to
qualify under the more particular exception is proof of
the insufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 77 Other courts routinely admit near misses and
even consider a near miss characteristic to be a positive
factor, weighing in favor of admission under the residual exceptions. 78
In Zenith Radio Corporation, Judge Becker
authored an opinion for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presenting a novel middle-ground approach which has periodically received favorable reviews. 79 The court held that
the residual exceptions should not be used to admit
hearsay evidence when the evidence is more appropriately subject to scrutiny under another specific exception covering a clearly defined category of hearsay
evidence. 8o The court reasoned, however, that most of
the hearsay exceptions did not delineate a clearly defined category but, rather, applied to a relatively "amorphous category of evidence."81 For near misses under
these amorphous exceptions, the court opined that the
residual exceptions could be invoked. 82 To proscribe
the use ofthe residual exceptions for this type ofhearsay
evidence would be to "negat[e] the residual exceptions
altogether."83
The Zenith Radio Corporation decision was reIV. THE THREE CATEGORIES OF RESIDUAL
versed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
HEARSAY
Evidence sought to be admitted under the residual Third Circuit. 84 Holding that all types of hearsay
exceptions can be delineated into three categories. In evidence may rightfully be considered under the reascending order oflegitimacy, they will be referred to as sidual exceptions even after failing admissibility standards under another applicable exception, the court
"garbage," "near misses," and "glass slippers."
criticized Judge Becker's theory on the grounds that it
A. Garbage
"Garbage" is evidence which should not be admit- had no precedential support and would place the federal
ted under the residual exceptions because it fails one or rules of evidence back into the "straightjacket" from
more of the five required elements. Most significantly which the residual exceptions were intended to be
and most often, garbage hearsay will not possess equiva- freed. 85
lent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 75
The Maryland courts' position in the near miss
debate
is unknown at this point. In promulgating the
B. Near Misses
In Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Elec- Maryland Rules of Evidence, the Rules Committee did
tric Industrial Company, Ltd., 76 an opponent ofhearsay not explicitly state whether "near misses" would be

admitted under the residual exceptions. Given the article published fifty years earlier which described a fire
choice ofregarding a near miss characteristic ofhearsay in the courthouse while it was under construction. The
evidence as either a positive or negative factor, the court found that the article did not fit within any
Maryland courts would probably hold that a near miss recognized hearsay exception but admitted the eviis a negative factor in the admissibility analysis. A dence on the basis that it was necessary, more probative
decision that a near miss is a positive factor would be a than any other evidence available, and contained suffideviation from Maryland's traditionally stricttreatment cient circumstantial guarantees oftrustworthiness. 91
of hearsay exceptions.
Dallas County is an exceptional case presenting
Treatment of the near miss problem is not, however, unanticipated circumstances. It was in anticipation of
reduced merely to this positive or negative determina- such glass slipper cases that the residual exceptions
tion. A prudent alternative approach to the near miss were devised.92
problem is to ignore it completely. The fact that hearsay
There is dispute, however, as to whether residual
evidence is a near miss should be construed to be neither hearsay must rise to the level of being "Dallas Countya positive nor negative factor-- it simply is not relevant. exceptional or unanticipated" to be admissible. In other
As outlined above, the admissibility
words, in addition to satisfying the
of hearsay evidence under the residual
five expressed requirements conexceptions is conditional upon the caretained
in the residual exceptions,
A "glass slipper" is
ful scrutiny and satisfaction of five remust residual hearsay also relate to
... a hearsay statequirements. This analysis should be done
a previously unaddressed subject?
ment that exhibits a
without regard to whether the evidence
There are valid arguments on
fit
under
the
perfect
is a near miss. 86
both sides of the issue. The reresidual exceptions.
This may mean that certain near
quirement that residual hearsay be
misses would be admitted under the
"exceptional" is not an expressed
.. Glass slippers are
residual exceptions while othernearmissrequirement
ofthe residual excepthe only evidence
es may be excluded. 87 This is all, howevtions and it may be an ambiguous
that should be adcriterion.93
er, beside the point. If the hearsay
milted
under
the
possesses equivalent circumstantial guarOn balance, there is validity to the
residual
exceptions.
antees of trustworthiness based upon
"exceptional" requirement. If the
satisfaction ofthe trustworthiness test as
proffered hearsay relates to but
fails the criteria of a specific and
advocated in section II.A. above, its
status as a near miss should not deprive
clearly defined hearsay exception,
that evidence of its rightful admissibility. 88
admitting the near miss hearsay under the residual
exceptions would undermine the purpose ofthe specific
c. Glass Slippers
A "glass slipper" is the name the author has given exception. 94
to a hearsay statement that exhibits a perfect fit under
However, the "exceptional" rationale could also
the residual exceptions by satisfying all five require- serve to exclude near miss hearsay relating to the
ments. Glass slippers are the only evidence that should relatively amorphous exceptions since those exceptions
be admitted under the residual exceptions. 89
do anticipate specific subject areas. This result, besides
The case most frequently cited in relation to the being contrary to the majority of courts' decisions, may
residual exceptions is the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap- have the effect of excluding otherwise trustworthy and
peals' decision in Dallas Countyv. Commercial Union necessary hearsay. 95
Assurance Company.90 In Dallas County, the plaintiff
Whether the Maryland courts will impose the "exattempted to seek remuneration from an insurer for a ceptional" or "unanticipated" requirement as part of
collapsed courthouse tower, claiming that it was struck Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b )(5) is unknown. Howby lightning. The insurer attempted to avoid the plaintiff's ever, incorporating this requirement in some manner
claim by asserting that the tower collapsed as a result of would be consistent with the rigorous approach ena structural weakness. As proof of the structural dorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
weakness, the insurer offered a copy of a newspaper Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Heyward. 96
_~_.
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evidencing only superficial guarantees oftrustworthi-

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FORE- ness. tOt Lastly, these courts often determine the trustSEEABLE ISSUES
worthiness ofthe grand jury testimony by impermissibly
A. Grand Jury Testimony
"bootstrapping" on the existence of corroborating
Federal Rule 804(b)(5) has served as the avenue by
which courts have allowed the introduction of grand
jury testimony from unavailable witnesses. Accordingly, this issue is likely to arise under Mary land Rule 5804(b)(5).
Arguably, grand jury testimony of an unavailable
witness should never be admitted as residual hearsay. It
is, in essence, a type of former testimony which should
be governed by Rule 5-804(b)(1).97 But grand jury
testimony is a near miss under Rule 5-804(b)( 1) because
the party against whom the testimony is ordinarily
offered did not have the opportunity to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
As a near miss under an arguably specific and clearly
defined hearsay exception, grand jury testimony should
not be admissible under the residual exceptions. 98 Admitting such evidence would have the effect of altering
and expanding the types of former testimony that are
permissible under Rule 5-804(b)(1), a result that the
residual exceptions are arguably not meant to accomplish.
This argument is persuasive. But it is not supported
by the decisions ofthe courts which have considered the
Issue.
The federal circuits are currently divided regarding
two concerns which are present in the context of
admitting grand jury testimony against a criminal defendant as residual hearsay. The first concern is whether
such evidence violates the rule against hearsay, or
whether it can satisfy all of the requirements of the
residual exceptions. The second issue is whether the
admission of an unavailable witness's grand jury testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.
Some courts routinely allow the admission of grand
jury testimony against a criminal defendant reasoning
that neither the rule against hearsay nor the Confrontation Clause will be violated as long as surrounding
circumstances and evidence corroborating the testimony provide a sufficient indicia of reliability. 99
These decisions are not well reasoned. They erroneously merge the hearsay and Confrontation Clause
analysis, deciding cases without any detailed distinction
between the two principles. 100 Moreover, these resultoriented decisions often admit grand jury testimony

evidence. 102
Other courts have taken a more restrictive approach
to the admission of grand jury testimony as residual
hearsay. These courts have clearly recognized and
given effect to the distinction between the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause and conducted two separate inquiries. 103 Using this approach, courts will allow
the admission of grand jury testimony only when the
substance ofthe grandjury testimony satisfies both the
requirements of the residual exceptions and the safeguards of the Confrontation Clause. In most of these
cases, however, courts have allowed the admission of
grand jury testimony from an unavailable witness under
the particular facts because the opposing party was
viewed to have "waived" the right to object under the
Confrontation Clause. t04 Under this so-called "waiver
theory ," if a party, by its conduct, causes the unavailability of the declarant of the grand jury testimony, the
party waives Confrontation Clause objections and, a
fortiori, any hearsay objections because "[t]he law
simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from murdering [or otherwise incapacitating] the
chief witness against him."105
The waiver theory seems to present an acceptable
median between routine admissions and strict exclusions of grand jury testimony in all cases. 106 Arguably,
hindering a witness's testimony presents an exceptional
situation warranting application of the residual exceptions.
Even if Maryland courts opt to take a restrictive
approach to grand jury testimony, it may not serve the
ends ofjustice or promote the growth and flexibility of
the law of evidence to exclude grand jury testimony in
such egregious circumstances.

B. Children's Statements
In recent years, the most prolific use of the residual
exceptions has been in child abuse prosecutions where
the child victim has been unable to testify at trial due to
emotional distress or incompetence. In these cases,
courts have routinely admitted the child victim's out-ofcourt statements to third parties as residual hearsay. 107
In Maryland, courts traditionally have been reluctant, at best, to admit this type of hearsay .108 As of July
1, 1994, however, this restrictive tradition may be

rule, is for the ascertainment of the truth. As long as
subject to change.
With the adoption ofthe residual exceptions, Mary- Maryland Rules 5 -803 (b )(24) and 5 -804(b)( 5) contribland courts will no longer be able to exclude child abuse ute to this goal, they are valuable and worthwhile.
There is no way to determine in advance if the
victim's statements merely because the statements do
109
not fall under a recognized exception. Instead, they residual exceptions will actually serve their purpose and
will be forced to conduct a residual exceptions analysis contribute to the judicial process in Maryland. In
to determine the trustworthiness and need for the child essence, it is an experiment.
Some are likely to disagree with this uncertain
hearsay statements.
Whether the Maryland courts will follow the broad outlook. They would like to believe that the Maryland
majority ofjurisdictions and admit child hearsay under residual exceptions will be scrupulously limited with
the residual exceptions is unknown. However, resis- virtually no deviation from the common law. This,
tance to admit this type of evidence, if any, will be however, is unlikely to prove true.
further undermined by §9-103.l of the Courts and
This article has attempted to show in many respects
Judicial Proceedings Article ofthe Mary land Annotated that the interpretation of the residual exceptions is not
Code (out of court statements of
an exact science; there are numerous issues subject to dechild abuse victims) and its 1994
bate.
amendments.
Enacted in 1988, § 9-103.1 is
Each year the residual
Each year the residual
a statutory hearsay exception
exceptions
generate approxiexceptions generate apwhich provides for the admismately fifty or more reported
proximately fifty or more
sion of an unavailable child
decisions. More than likely,
reported decisions. More
Maryland courts will contribute
victim's out-of-court statement
than
likely,
Maryland
to these numbers.
to prove the truth of the matter
courts will contribute to
asserted if 1) the child is under
However, the active inthe age of 12 years; 2) the statetegration of the residual excepthese numbers.
ment is not admissible under any
tions into Maryland law should
not be construed as the demise
other hearsay exception; 3) the
of the hearsay rule. Instead, a
statement possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiconsistent and sound interpreness"; 4) the statement is made to a licensed physician, tation ofthe residual exceptions in conformity with the
psychologist, social worker, or teacher acting in the principles underlying the hearsay rule will result in a
course of the individual's profession at the time of the body ofevidentiary law securing flexibility and fairness
statement; 5) there is corroborating evidence; and 6) for the future.
notice is provided to the opponent at least twenty days
ENDNOTES
before the statement is adduced.
During Maryland's 1994 legislative session, the
statute was amended to allow for the admission of a 1 Title 5 of the Maryland Rules will not, however, be
child victim's hearsay statement regardless of whether applicable (1) in any trial or hearing commenced prior
thechildisavailablefortrial. The adoption ofthe newly- to July 1, 1994, or (2) to admit evidence against a
amended §9-1 03.1, along with the residual exceptions, defendant in a criminal action whose crime was allegbodes in favor of the proponents of child hearsay edly committed prior to July 1, 1994, unless such
evidence. The two provisions will potentially function evidence would have been admissible under the law and
as powerful, alternative vehicles promoting the admis- Rules in effect on June 30, 1994.
sion of child hearsay. 1\0
2 5-803(b)(24) provides: "Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
CONCLUSION
Most would agree that the primary purpose of the A statement not specifically covered by any of the
hearsay rule and its exceptions, like any other evidentiary foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circum_____ ._________________ ______ 25.11 U. Bait. L=. -
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stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and
the interests ofjustice will be best served by admission
ofthe statement into evidence. A statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of
it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant."
5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5) differ only in that the
latter requires a showing ofthe declarant's unavailability whereas the former is applicable without regard to
the issue of availability. Most courts refer to the two
sections interchangeably and analyze them without
differences in application. E.g., United States v. Kim,
595 F.2d. 755, 765 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also
Emerging Problems Under The Federal Rules of Evidence (David A. Schlueter ed., 2d ed. 1991).
3 E.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238,302 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
4 E.g., James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 787, 794
(1993).
5 Proponents of Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5)
suggested to the Rules Committee that without these
provisions, the law of hearsay and its exceptions would
become detrimentally "frozen." It was explained that
the now-existing exceptions to the hearsay rule were
not conceived overnight but were rather formulated
over hundreds of years of judicial experience. To
suppose that all reliable and necessary exceptions to the
hearsay rule have been determined and recognized by
the courts would not only be presumptuous but erroneous. In the absence of the residual exceptions, Maryland courts would not have the vehicle to effectively
deal with probable future cases which would present
reliable and necessary hearsay evidence not specifically
covered under the currently recognized exceptions.
Interview with Lynn McClain, University of Baltimore
Professor of Law and Special Reporter to the Court of
Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and

Procedure, in Baltimore, Maryland (March 4, 1994).
When Colorado initially adopted an evidence code
modeled after the federal rules, it did not include the
residual exceptions. However, after the case ofW CL.
v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984), the Colorado
Rules ofEvidence were amended. In reluctantly reversing a lower court's admission of a child's trustworthy
hearsay statement identifying her abuser, the Supreme
Court of Colorado opined that the facts in the case
demonstrated the wisdom of including in the Colorado
Rules of Evidence a residual hearsay exception such as
that in Federal Rule 803(24). Id. at 178-82.
6 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24) Committee Note derivedfrom
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Advisory Committee's Note and
Senate Judiciary Committee Report.
7 4
David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller,
Federal Evidence § 472, at 923 (1980).

8Id.
9 "In order to establish a well-defined jurisprudence, the

special facts and circumstances which, in the court's
judgment, indicates [sic] that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness and necessity to
justify its admission should be stated on the record."
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee
Report; See also Huffv. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d
286,291-92 (7th Cir. 1979) (reviewing the trial court's
ruling of rej ecting the offering of a statement under the
residual exception, the court noted that in reviewing
discretionary findings it is "greatly aided when the
record contains a statement ofthe reasons for the ruling
and any findings made .... ").
\0 E.g., United States v. Bachsian, 4 F.3d 796, 797 (9th
Cir. 1993); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844,853 (S.D.
1993); Hallv. State,611 So.2d915, 917 (Miss. 1992);
State v. Barger, 810 P.2d 191, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990). For appellate review of residual hearsay on
constitutional grounds, however, the standard of reviewis de novo. But see Lynn McLain, Maryland Rules
of Evidence § 2.803.1 (11) (West 1994) (One court of
appeals judge expressed an opinion that the standard for
reviewing a trial court's decision on any residual hearsay should not be an abuse of discretion standard.
Instead, the judge feltthat by allowing residual hearsay,
the trial court would, in effect, be creating a new hearsay
exception applicable to the case before it. An error in
this capacity would not only amount to an error as an
evidentiary ruling but also on a matter of law. The
judge, therefore, opined that de novo review should

apply to all evidence admitted under the residual exceptions.). See also Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule
at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto By Judicial
Discretion? 76 Minn. L. Rev. 507,517 (1992) ("[T]he
appellate decisions [concerning the residual exceptions] are not offering an effective stopgap, in part,
because they review an admission of such hearsay for
abuse of discretion and harmless error ... [which has]
infected the review of evidentiary issues concerning
questions oflaw which should be determined de novo. ").
II See e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F .2d 1321,
1350 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that entries in a desk
calendar appointment diary kept by a government witness were within Federal Rule 804(24) because "[a]
number offactors combine to demonstrate the reliability ofthe entries: the highly self-incriminatory nature of
the entries themselves, the regularity with which they
were made, [and the witness's] need to rely on the
entries. Where evidence complies with the spirit, if not
the l[e]tter ofseveral exceptions, admissibility is appropriate under the residual exception."); See also United
States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (1Ith Cir.)
(court compared grand jury testimony to the other four
exceptions under 804(b)) cert. dismissed, 495 U.S. 944
(1989).
12 See id
134 Jack B. Weinstein& Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence ~ 800[01] at 800-9 to 800-10 (1984).
14Id
15 Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 957, 959 (1974).
16 See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application ofthe Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
177,218 (1948).
17Id
18Id
19 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence
§ 801.1, at 682 (2d ed. 1986).
20 Id at 682-83.
21 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2).
22 Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692,697,452 A.2d 661,
664 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v.
State, 331 Md. 549,569,629 A.2d 633, 643 (1993).
23 See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,21,536 A.2d
666, 676 (1988).
24 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 803(2).1 (1987).
25 Hensley v. Rich, 38 Md. App. 334, 341, 380 A.2d 252,
255 (1977).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

,<_

Note that the trustworthiness test is only relevant to
the admissibility of hearsay statements. That is, only
out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth ofthe
matter asserted need satisfy this test. For example, an
out-of-court statement offered as circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind only answers the
question of whether the declarant had the belief. However, because the statement is not offered to prove the
truth, whether the statement reflects reality is irrelevant.
The statement is admitted as non-hearsay.
27 In an effort to determine the trustworthiness of a
hearsay statement, some courts have examined whether
other extrinsic evidence in the case corroborates the
truthfulness ofthe hearsay statement. E.g., United
States v. Guinan, 836 F.2d350, 356-57 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,487U.S.1218 (1988); UnitedStatesv. Barlow,
693 F.2d 954,962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1982).
The corroboration factor, however, would seem to
be inappropriate in light ofthe Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23 (1990),
in which the Court opined that the analysis of a hearsay
statement should be restricted to the circumstances
surrounding the making ofthe statement without consideration of corroborative facts establishing the accuracy of the statement. See infra part IlI.A.
28 As a model in accordance with the trustworthiness
test, the author proposes that a court should, at a
minimum, ask the following questions to ascertain the
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement:
Does the Declarant Have the BelieF
Narration/Ambiguity:
1) Is the statement subject to differing interpretations?
2) Is the event which the declarant spoke of so
complex that mere words may not be able to accurately
convey the nature of the event?
Sincerity:
1) Would the declarant have a motive to fabricate?
2) Was the statement a result ofleading questions or any other type of suggestiveness?
Does the Declarant's Belief Reflect Reality?
Perception:
1) Did the declarant have a first-hand perception ofthe event being described?
2) Could the declarant have been honestly mistaken?
26
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Memory:
1) Did the declarant have time for reflective
thought between the event and the statement such that
he or she could have been influenced by emotions or
intellect?
2) Was the method of preserving the information contained in the statement subject to error?
29 E.g., United States v. Irish People, Inc., 595 F. Supp.
114, 120 (D.D.C. 1984) (letters obtained in search of
defendant's files held to be admissible under Federal
Rule 803(24) because the letters possessed an aura of
credibility similar to that of business records since they
were "intemalletters" produced in the business setting
and the authors had no reason to falsify its contents; no
consideration given to memory factor), rev 'd on other
grounds, 796 F.2d 520 (l986).
30 See e.g., United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1976) (upholding the admission of inconsistent
hearsay statements as substantive evidence under Federal Rule 803(24) because although the hearsay statements were not given under oath or in another proceeding, indicia of reliability was present in light of the fact
that statements had been made shortly after the events
occurred and the declarants were available to be crossexamined as to their sincerity); Grimes v. Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. a/Wis., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska
1977) ("There are no problems with perception, memory
or meaning, and any sincerity problems can be solved by
having the verifying witness and the plaintiff-actor
subj ect to cross-examination. ").
31 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
32 Tribe, supra note 15, at 962.
33 E.g., Huffv. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286,294
(7th Cir. 1979). See also McCormick on Evidence §
324, at 366 (4th ed. 1992).
34 Cf United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559
(E.D.N. Y), ("This [materiality] requirement seems redundant since, if it did not tend to prove or disprove a
material fact, the evidence would not be relevant and
would not be admissible under Rules 401 and 402.
What is probably meant is that the [residual] exception
should not be used for trivial or collateral matters.")
aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977); Graham, supra, note 19 § 803.24, at
925 ("The requirement that the statement be offered as
evidence ofa material fact probably means that not only
must the fact the statement is offered to prove be
relevant, Rule 401, but that the fact to be proved be of

substantial importance in determining the outcome of
the litigation.").
35 United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-89
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (l982).
36 See id.
37 See e.g., United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294,299
(5th Cir. 1977) (characterizing this requirement as a
"built-in requirement of necessity.").
38 Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee
Report.
39 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee Report ("The committee believes that there are
certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which
is found by a court to have guarantees reflected by the
presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of
prolativeness [sic] and necessity could properly be
admissible.").
40 See e.g., Larez v. City ofLos Angeles, 946 F.2d 630
(9th Cir. 1991) (court held reversible error to admit
quotations from three independent newspapers because
the newspaper reporters would have provided better
evidence ofthe statements and would have been subj ect
to cross-examination); Noble v. Alabama Dept. 0/
Envtl. Mgmt., 872 F.2d 361, 366 (l1th Cir. 1989)
(admission ofletters was improper where proponent of
evidence made no showing that reasonable efforts could
not have produced the writers).
41 E.g., Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d
319,325 (lOth Cir. 1989) (excluding two published
reports as hearsay not satisfying Federal Rule 803(24)
because much of the information contained in the
reports was otherwise admitted through the testimony
of various experts). Contra Louisell et aI., supra note
7, §472, at 936 (1980) ("Amore constructive reading
[ofthe necessity requirement] requires the proponent of
a statement under the [residual] exception to introduce
all evidence within his reasonable reach which is 'more
probative' on the point in question than the statement.
.. first. [T]his reading implies that a diligent party may
resort to the [residual] exception even though 'more
probative' evidence has already been received on the
point in question. And this reading is the preferable one:
It serves adequately the congressional purpose of preventing unnecessary resort to the [residual] exception
while stopping short of excluding automatically those
statements which are trustworthy and relevant on points
which remain sufficiently in doubt to be resolvable
either way by the trier of fact.").
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Md. Rule 5-403 ("Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by ... needless cumulative evidence."). Cj
Weinstein et aI., supra note 11, ~ 803(24)[01] at 803379 ("Even though the evidence may be somewhat
cumulative, it may be important in evaluating other
evidence and arriving at the truth so that the 'more
probative' requirement can not [sic] be interpreted with
cast iron rigidity.").
The author would concur with the view ofadmitting
hearsay evidence under the residual exception for such
limited instances in which the probative value of the
residual hearsay is clearly not minimal. Cf United
States v. Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (admitting hearsay evidence to boost
the credibility of a co-conspirator in the government's
case-in-chief). Cf Hing Shair Chan with United States
v. Belfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding as
harmless error the admission ofa child's hearsay statement which was not more probative than other extensively available evidence).
The Belfany court's view of holding as harmless
error the admission of cumulative hearsay under the
residual exception if other more probative evidence
could have sustained the verdict is widely shared.
Quaere: Doesn't this rationale have the effect ofnullifYing the necessity requirement? Wouldn't the extraordinary purpose of the residual exceptions be better
served by adopting a stricter approach in which the
erroneous admission ofevidence under the exception be
viewed as more than harmless error? See generally
deMarsv. Equitable Life Assurance Soc yo/the United
States, 610 F.2d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The requirements of [the necessity requirement] of the rule cannot
be ignored. ").
43 E.g., UnitedStatesv. Simmons, 773 F.2d 1455, 1459
(4th Cir. 1985) (necessity requirement met where the
alternative to the admission of Bureau of Alcohol,
Tabacco, and Firearms trace forms was to require the
government to bring custodians of the manufacturer's
records from across the country to testifY to the simple
fact that certain weapons were moved in interstate
commerce); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109,
119 (9th Cir. 1979) (court allowed the admission of
Chilean travel documents because the government could
not obtain any other equivalent evidence). See also
Weinstein et aI., supra note 13, ~ 803(24)[01], at 803379 (1984) ("It should not be necessary to scale the
42

highest mountains ofTibet to obtain a deposition for use
in a $500 damage claim arising from an accident with a
postal truck. ").
44 Louisell et aI., supra note 7, § 472 at 936.
45 Of course, this issue is inapplicable to a case in which
hearsay is sought to be admitted under 5-804(b)(5)
where the declarant is unavailable.
46 E.g. United States v. MathiS, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.
1977). See also Parsons v. Honeywell, 929 F.2d 901
(2d Cir. 1991).
47 DallasCountyv. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,
286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (hearsay was necessary
because knowledgeable witnesses had either died or
had faded memories).
48 See Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 743 (2d Cir.
1981); Weinstein et aI., supra note 13, ~ 803(24)[01],
at 379, n. 13 (1990).
49 Contra UnitedStatesv. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 28889 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a prosecution witness'
pretrial affidavit which was inconsistent with his incourt testimony was properly received under 803(24),
court reasoned that "the interests of justice were best
served by providing the jury with as much information
as possible" on the subject addressed in the affidavit).
50 Cf Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d
319, 325 (10th Cir. 1989) (in excluding two published
reports because much of the information contained in
the reports was otherwise admitted through expert
testimony, court held that the "interests ofjustice" did
not require the admission ofthese reports into evidence;
court should have reasoned that the reports were not
more probative on the point for which they were offered
than the expert testimony); United States v. Mandel,
591 F.2d 1347, 1369 (4th Cir. 1979) (statements made
by unidentified legislators during "heat of political
battle" held to be inadmissible under 803(24) because
neither the purposes of the Federal Rules nor the
interests of justice would be served by admitting this
evidence: "In a criminal case we must be careful that a
conviction is not based on speculation."; proper reasoning would have been to state that the out-of-court
statements were not trustworthy).
51 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has adopted a strict approach to the notice
requirement. In United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346,
358 (2d Cir. 1978), the court held that "[t]here is
absolutely no doubt that Congress intended that the
notice requirement be rigidly enforced." The fact that
.25.1 / U. :30:11:. ~_.f. - ::~)
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the proponent first discovered the need for the evidence
only after trial had commenced was deemed irrelevant.
Id.
52 E.g., United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d
Cir. 1978) (court reasoned that since legislative purpose behind the notice requirement is to provide the
adverse party with sufficient opportunity to counter the
evidence, the purpose is satisfied when the proponent is
without fault and the court allows a continuance in
order to provide "a fair opportunity to prepare to
contest the use of the statement"); United States v.
Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976) (court reasoned
that there must be flexibility in the notice requirement
where the need to offer evidence under the residual
hearsay exception does not become apparent until after
the trial has begun); United States v. Carlson, 547 F .2d
1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)
(court excused government's failure to give notice
sufficiently in advance of trial where the government
first learned on the eve of trial that its witness would
disobey a court order and refuse to testify; defendant
was acutely aware of the proffered evidence and its
substance prior to trial).
53 E.g., United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 718, 771 (9th
Cir. 1985); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir.
1979).
54 E.g., United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir.
1992) (court refused to consider the admissibility of
hearsay evidence under the residual exceptions where
the argument was first raised on appeal); United States
v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1990)
(court refused to consider Federal Rule 803(24) as a
basis for admissibility when the. government first raised
the issue in its amended jury instructions).
55 David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the
Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search ofa
Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 867,904 (1982).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
62 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
63 Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions are exceptions
which are "clearly identifiable and classically recognized." Cassidyv. State, 74 Md. App. at 8-9,536 A.2d
at 669-70. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66
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(1980).
64 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.
65 Id. at 820.
66 Id. at 823.
67Id. Contra id. at 827 (Kennedy, J.,joined by Rehnquist,
C.l., White, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting: "It is a
matter of common sense for most people that one ofthe
best ways to determine whether what someone says is
trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other
evi dence. ").
68The trustworthiness test is aimed at determining particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness such that crossexamination would be of marginal utility. The method
is also employed without regard to corroborative evidence. See supra note 28.
69 297 Md. 191,464 A.2d 986 (1983) (plurality opinion).
7°Id. at 210,464 A.2d at 996.
71Id. at 211, 464 A.2d at 997.
72 Id.
73 But see Powell v. State, 85 Md. App. 330, 343, 583
A.2d 1114, 1120 (stating that the Foster decision was
obtained by only a plurality vote and therefore has no
precedential significance), aff'd on other grounds, 324
Md. 441, 597 A.2d 479 (1991).
74 McLain, supra note 24, § 803(24).2, n.6 and accompanying text.
75 E.g., Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir.
1992) (The wife of an arrestee brought a civil rights
action against the city, county and several police officers. The wife alleged that the officers used excessive
force in subduing her husband, causing him permanent
disability. To prove that they were justified in using
force against the arrestee, the defendants offered evidence ofthe husband's guilty plea to the misdemeanor
of assault and battery stemming from the arrest in
question. After admitting the hearsay evidence as an
admission, the court held that the guilty plea could
alternatively be admitted under 803(24) because it had
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The court reasoned that the truth of the matter
contained in the guilty plea was reliable because the
arrestee was represented by counsel and had sufficient
opportunity to challenge the guilty plea after it was
entered.) (sub silentio); Polansky v. CNA Insurance
Co., 852 F.2d 626,631 (1st Cir. 1988)(ln this breach
ofcontract suit, plaintiff sued insurer for unjustly refusing to reimburse owner for fire damage to apartment.

Insurer asserted that the fire was set deliberately by the
plaintiff. To rebut the insurer's allegation, the plaintiff
offered a letter written by plaintiff s public adjuster, and
sent to the insurer, stating that it was both the plaintiff s
and the adjuster's understanding that the insurer had
told the plaintiffthat he was not a suspect in the fire. The
appellate court held as garbage the letter because it was
"merely a self-serving statement written by a representative of the party who [sought] its admission .... ");
Cookv. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684,690-91 (7th Cir. 1986)
(A tenant sued a landlord for negligence after suffering
injuries from a fall on a stairway. The landlord attempted to introduce statements contained in the
plaintiff s medical records stating that the plaintiff had
received injuries in a "shoving or wrestling match"
prior to the fall. Reversing the trial court's admission
of the statements, the court held that because the
declarant ofthe statements was unknown, the circumstances under which the declarant made the statements
lacked sufficient guarantees oftrustworthiness. ); United
States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983,993-94 (11th Cir. 1985)
(In a prosecution for the murder of a government agent,
the court held as garbage the admission ofthe murdered
agent's statement through the agent's supervisor in
which the agent allegedly told the supervisor ofa sample
received while conducting a cocaine deal with the
defendant. The trial court allowed the hearsay, holding
that the statements had circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness; among other things, the agent's report
was made within thirty minutes of the fact, and the
agent's life, the lives of fellow agents, and the success
of the investigation depended on the accuracy of the
report.), reh 'g denied, 772 F.2d 918 (11 th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986).
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505 F. Supp. 1190, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev 'd sub
nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238,302 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
77 E.g., United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
78United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 573 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); United
States v. Popenas, 780 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Frazier, 678 F. Supp. 499, 503 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 806 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1986).
79 E.g., Gary W. Majors, Comment, Admitting 'Near
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Misses' Under the Residual Hearsay Exceptions, 66
Or. L. Rev. 599,622 (1987) ("Judge Becker deserved
a better hearing than he received. His analysis exposed
the heart of the problem by acknowledging the folly of
treating all near misses as alike in significance. ").
80 Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 1263. As an
example, the court noted that the former testimony
exception ofF ederal Rule 804(b)( 1) applied to a clearly
defined category ofevidence, specifying the conditions
ofadmissibility for evidence in this category. The court
also indicated that the learned treatises and jUdgment of
previous conviction exceptions covered clearly defined
categories of evidence. Id. at 1264.
81 Id. at 1264. In illustration, the court stated that the
business records exception was amorphous because it
could be applied to any "memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form." Id. Likewise, the
court cited declarations against interest, present sense
impressions, and recorded recollection as other amorphous categories of exceptions.
82Id.
83Id.
84 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
85Id. at 302-03 ("Without doubt the [residual] exceptions were not intended to have broad application. This
does not warrant, however, the creation of some new
theory of limitation that seems more to complicate
matters than to resolve them.").
86 E.g., UnitedStatesv. York, 1989 WL 69269 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (Rejecting the admissibility of a statement offered under Federal Rule 804(b)( 5) which was also not
admissible under 804(b)(3), the court did not analyze
the issue in near miss terms. Instead, the court simply
held that a statement which was not trustworthy enough
to be a declaration against interest did not meet the
trustworthiness requirement ofthe residual exceptions.).
87 Viewing somewhat favorably the rationale underlying
Judge Becker's theory, the author would advance that
the theory be employed as a tool for guidance in
deciding which types ofnear misses should be admitted.
Guidance, however, is not tantamount to reliance.
Strict reliance upon Judge Becker's theory would create other problems. For instance, Judge Becker's
theory opens a Pandora's Box of judicial debate as to
which hearsay exceptions would be regarded as being
amorphous or clearly-defined.
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88 Contra Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect ofthe Catchalls
on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets
the Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 925 (1992) (arguing that admission ofnear misses
under the residual exception has the effect of nullifying
the other exceptions).
89 E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d
513 (10th Cir. 1987) (In this trademark infringement
case between two manufacturers offishing equipment,
plaintiff alleged that the defendant produced a fishing
reel so similar as to confuse customers as to the source
of the reels. As proof of the public's confusion, the
plaintiff offered a consumer survey conducted in the
shopping areas of five cities. The court held that it was
not error for the trial court to have admitted the survey
as possessing the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness.); UnitedStatesv. Cowley, 720F.2d 1037 (9thCir.
1983) (Defendant objected to the admission of a letter
bearing a postmark from Santa Barbara. The postmark
was hearsay because it was offered to show that a letter
had been mailed from Santa Barbara. The court reasoned, however, that unlike most hearsay, "the postmark is very reliable; there is very little risk of
misperception on the part of the postal official. Even
though it does not easily fit into any of the enumerated
exceptions ... the postmark's circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness make it a perfect candidate for
Federal Rule 803(24) .... " The postmark in this case,
however, was excluded because the proponent failed to
give advance notice. Otherwise, the postmark would
have been a glass slipper.).
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286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
91 The evidence was deemed to be necessary because
witnesses to the alleged fire, ifany were still alive, were
incapable offully recalling the event. The trustworthiness of the evidence was assured in that a newspaper
would be unlikely to falsify an event widely known and
discussed in the community.
92 Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee
Report ("Because exceptional cases like the Dallas
County case may arise in the future, the committee has
decided to reinstate a residual exception for rules 804
and 804(b).").
93 See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F.
Supp. 859, 865-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Rule 803(24)
establishes sufficient express criteria which must be
satisfied before an item of hearsay will be admissible ..
.. There is no requirement that the Court find a case to

be 'exceptional,' whatever that means, in order to
receive any evidence.") (emphasis added).
94 Cf supra note 81 and accompanying text.
95 See supra part IV.B.
96 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir. 1984) (residual
hearsay exception should be "'used very rarely and only
in exceptional circumstances' "), cert. denied, 469 U. S.
1105 (1985). It is noteworthy, however, thattheFourth
Circuit is one of few circuits which routinely and
liberally permits the introduction of grand jury testimony under Rule 805(b)(5). See infra part V.A. One
could argue that the admission of grand jury testimony
as residual hearsay is at odds with the restrictive decree
in Heyward. It will be interesting to see ifthe Maryland
courts can maintain consistency among their decisions
in individual cases.
97 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1): Former Testimony - Testimony given as a witness in any action or proceeding or
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of any action or proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
98 See supra note 81.
99 E.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.
1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F .2d 586 (7th
Cir.1982); UnitedStatesv. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart,
1., and Marshall, J. dissenting); United States v. West,
574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
100 E.g., United States v. West, 574 F.2d at 1136-38.
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Exception, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1033, 1067 (1985).
102 Compare UnitedStatesv. Garner, 574F.2dat 114446 (admitting the grand jury testimony of an alleged coconspirator under Federal Rule 804(b)(5) on the basis
that such testimony possessed substantial guarantees of
trustworthiness in that there was ample corroborative
evidence) with supra note 66 and accompanying text.
The existence of corroborating evidence would also
seem to favor exclusion of the grand jury testimony in
the sense that the hearsay would neither be necessary
nor more probative.
103 E.g., United States v. Balarno, 618 F.2d 624 (10th
Cir. 1980).
104 E.g., id See also United States v. Mastrangelo, 693

F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 70 ("Unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), which
F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Evans creates a miscellaneous exception to the Hearsay Rule
v. United States, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
for other' equivalent circumstantial guarantees oftrust105 United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (5th Cir.
worthiness,' Maryland, in the common law tradition, is
1982). Some circuits require proof of waiver by a more rigorous and orthodox in its approach to hearsay
preponderance ofthe evidence; others require clear and exceptions. A proponent will not satisfy the rule by
convincing proof
showing generalized indicia oftrustworthiness but must
106 See Judd Burstein, Admission of an Unavailable
qualify under one of the clearly identifiable and classiWitness' Grand Jury Testimony: Can It Be Justified? cally recognized exceptions.").
4 Cardozo L. Rev. 263 (1983).
110 Caveat: Application ofboth provisions must comply
\07 E.g., UnitedStatesv. Grooms, 978F.2d425 (8thCir.
with the mandate ofidaho v. Wright that corroboration
1992); Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. must not be a consideration in determining reliability.
1992); United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
1992).
108 Compare Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d
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666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988)
with In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27
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of Baltimore School of Law in May 1994. He is
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